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BURMA'S ROHINGYAS IN CRISIS: 
PROTECTION OF "HUMANITARIAN" 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL lAW 
THOMAS K. RAGLAND* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since late 1991, large numbers of Muslims have fled their homes 
in Burma's northwestern Arakan state l seeking refuge in neighboring 
Bangladesh. Striving to escape widespread murder, rape, torture, 
forced labor, and ethnic and religious persecution at the hands of the 
Burmese military, over 220,000 refugees, known as Rohingyas,2 now 
reside in makeshift camps along the border.3 Conditions in the camps 
have steadily worsened: as more refugees have arrived, the Bangladeshi 
government has withheld food rations, slowed the construction of 
shelter, and imposed other restrictive measures to compel the refugees 
to return to Burma.4 Many refugees have even been beaten, raped, and 
robbed by local police.5 In addition, the Rohingyas-particularly the 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the representatives of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma 
(NCGUB) for their inspiration and assistance. 
1 "Burma" is the official name of the country under the 1947 constitution. After seizing power 
in a coup d'etat in 1988, a military junta changed the name to Myanmar. "Myanmar" is a 
contraction of the name "Myanmar naing-ngan," which in the Burmese language means "nation 
of the swift and strong people." U Kyaw Min, Brutality in Burma, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at 
B6. This Note refers to the country as Burma rather than as Myanmar as a refusal to acknowledge 
the actions of an illegitimate government The junta continues to commit innumerable human 
rights violations, to defy the results of the 1990 elections, and to inflict extreme suffering on the 
Burmese people. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MYANMAR: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOP-
MENTS JULY TO DECEMBER 1993 (1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS]. The name 
Burma is used to show solidarity with all those struggling for democracy and freedom in Burma. 
2 For a description of the Rohingyas, see infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
3 See generally AsIA WATCH, ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES FROM ARAKAN (1993) [hereinafter 
ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES]; ASIA WATCH, BURMA: RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION IN NORTHERN ARAKAN (1992) [hereinafter RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION]. The number of refugees currently in the camps has decreased from a high of 
over 300,000 before repatriations began in early 1992. See Angelo Ribeiro, Special Rapporteur, 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Repart on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination (Jan. 6, 
1993), in NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA, DEMOCRACY AND POLI-
TICS IN BURMA 350-61 (1993) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA]. 
4 U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, BANGLADESH'S ABOUT-FACE PUTS BURMESE REFUGEES AT 
RISK 1 (1992) [hereinafter BANGLADESH'S ABOUT-FACE]. 
5 ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 7-15. 
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children-suffer increasingly from a high death rate, a variety of health 
problems, and widespread malnutrition.6 Since December 1991, more 
than two thousand refugees have died in the camps.7 
In early 1992, the Burmese and Bangladeshi governments, with 
the involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), agreed on a plan to allow the return of some Muslims 
to Arakan.8 Enforcement of the agreement, however, immediately en-
countered difficulties. The UNHCR and the international community 
rejected Burma's terms,9 which not only limited reentry to those refu-
gees who the government deemed "genuine citizens," but also did not 
guarantee that international groups would be allowed to monitor the 
repatriation process. IO 
Fearful of further abuses by the Burmese military, refugees in the 
camps have vigorously resisted being returned to Arakan,u Conse-
quently, the repatriation process has slowed, although formal talks 
between the Burmese and Bangladeshi governments have continued.12 
In the meantime, Bangladesh has tightened security in the camps, 
arrested or killed many who have protested the repatriation plan, 
compiled lists of refugees' names, and taken other steps to expedite 
the Rohingyas' departure. 13 In November 1993, Burmese officials 
finally agreed to provide the UNHCR access to Rohingyas who are 
repatriated from Bangladesh and to allow international monitoring of 
the human rights situation in Arakan. 14 Those refugees who return, 
6 BANGLADESH'S ABOUT-FACE, supra note 4, at 1. 
7 BURMA ACTION GROUP U.K., BURMA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR CON-
STRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT 10 (1992) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT]. 
8 The repatriation agreement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Burma and Bangladesh on 
April 28, 1992, stipulated that refugees would be returned beginning May 15, 1992. Joint State-
ments l!y the Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh and Myanmar Issued at the Conclusion of the Official 
Visit of the Myanmar Foreign Minister to Bangladesh (Apr. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Joint Statements], 
in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 309-12, 313-15; AsIA WATCH, CHANGES 
IN BURMA? 7 (1992); BURMA UPDATE, ROHINGYA REPATRIATION 5 (1992); U.S. COMMITTEE FOR 
REFUGEES, BANGLADESH AND BURMA AGREE ON REPATRIATION OF BURMESE REFUGEES: U.S. COM-
MITTEE FOR REFUGEES URGES CAUTION 1 (1992) [hereinafter USCR URGES CAUTION]. 
9 Asian nations with large Muslim populations, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Brunei, were particularly critical of the repatriation plan. See, e.g., Press Statement of Dr. Hamid 
Algadid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, The Situation of the 
Muslims in Burma (undated), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 313. 
10 CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 8; Sylvana Foa, Memorandum from Chief Spokeswoman 
of the u.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (May 8,1992), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, 
supra note 3, at 312-13. 
II See CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 9-10; see also Nadeem Qadir, Six People Die in 
Fresh Clashes as Burma Refugees Take Up Arms, NATION (Bangkok), July 17,1992, at AI. 
12 BURMA UPDATE, supra note 8, at 5. 
13 CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 9-12; ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES, supra note 3, 
at 7-15. 
14 HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 12. 
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however, face an uncertain future, including the risk of renewed abuses 
at the hands of the tatmadaw, Burma's 300,000-strong army.15 
Human rights violations are widespread in Burma.16 For nearly six 
years, the nation has been ruled by a military junta known as the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1988, following the 
nationwide peaceful pnxiemocracy demonstrations that brought down 
the country's long-standing military dictator, the SLORC seized power 
in a coup and violently crushed popular oppositionY The resulting 
massacre left thousands dead and hundreds of thousands either im-
prisoned or displaced. 18 A large number of student activists fled to 
mountainous regions along the Thai-Burma border.19 
In multiparty elections held by the SLORC in May 1990, the 
opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 
eighty percent of the electorate. The NLD accomplished this despite 
the government's restrictions on organizing and campaigning, its in-
timidation of opposition candidates, and its refusal to permit key 
opposition leaders to run.20 During the past four years, however, the 
SLORC has refused to honor the results of the election.21 Instead of 
transferring power to the democratically elected representatives, the 
junta has arrested, tortured, or executed nearly all of them.22 In addi-
tion, the SLORC has escalated the civil war between government forces 
and various ethnic insurgency groups that has been ongoing for the 
15 See, e.g., Yozo Yokota, Special Rapporteur, UN. Commission on Human Rights, Report on 
the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (Feb. 17, 1993), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN 
BURMA, supra note 3, at 373-74, 383-85. 
16 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BURMA (MYANMAR): PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN 
MYANMAR-A CHRONICLE OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1988 (1989) [hereinafter PRIS-
ONERS OF CONSCIENCE]. 
17 See generally id.; BERTIL LINTNER, OUTRAGE: BURMA's STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY (1989). 
18 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 16, at 4, 13; BURMA TODAY: LAND OF HOPE AND 
TERROR 17 (Eric Kolvig ed., 1991) [hereinafter BURMA TODAY]. 
19 See LINTNER, supra note 17, at 196-215. Other students traveled to India, where many have 
sought temporary refuge or permanent asylum. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE 
SURVEY 1992, at 33 (1992) [hereinafter WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]. 
20 ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA (MYANMAR) IN 1991, at 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA]. The most famous Burmese opposition leader, Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi, who formed the National League for Democracy, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
absentia on October 14, 1991. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER WRITINGS 
222,236-37 (1991). 
21 U Sein Win, Preface to DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at V. 
22Id. A small group of elected representatives escaped to the border of Thailand, and on 
December 18, 1990 established, in exile, the opposition National Coalition Government of the 
Union of Burma (NCGUB). Id. The primary objectives of the NCGUB are (1) to remove the 
SLORC military regime; (2) to call for a national convention of all elected officials, members of 
the Democratic Alliance of Burma (the umbrella organization of most nationalities), and students 
and monks in the liberated area; and (3) to work toward the establishment of a genuine 
democracy in Burma. Id. at VI. 
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past forty years.23 From pro-democracy students in the cities to ethnic 
armies in the hills, Burma's military dictators have sought to destroy 
all sources of resistance to their rule. In 1991, the SLORC's oppressive 
campaign reached those in the westernmost region of the country, the 
Muslim Rohingyas of Arakan.24 The current refugee emergency in 
Bangladesh is a result of the atrocities committed by the army against 
this population. 
This Note argues that the Rohingyas in Bangladesh have the 
right, under established principles of international refugee law, hu-
man rights law, and humanitarian law, not to return to Burma until 
hostilities have ceased and their safety can be guaranteed. Part II 
recounts the history of the ethnic and religious oppression that has 
been inflicted upon Muslims in the Arakan region, and details the 
specific human rights abuses this group has suffered at the hands of 
the Burmese military. Part III explains the current crisis faced by the 
Rohingyas, and describes the roles played by the two nations directly 
involved and by members of the international community. Part IV 
examines the obligations of the Burmese and Bangladeshi govern-
ments under international legal norms, and concludes that both states 
are in violation of fundamental principles of refugee, human rights, 
and humanitarian law. Finally, Part V offers recommendations for 
addressing the Rohingya crisis that go beyond a mere enunciation of 
the obligations imposed by international law. 
II. THE ROHINGYAS OF ARAKAN STATE 
Situated along Burma's western coastline on the Bay of Bengal, 
Arakan state borders Bangladesh at its northern tip. The population 
of Rohingyas, one of several Muslim groups in Arakan,25 is estimated 
to be at least 1.4 million in a province with a total population of 
approximately 3-3.5 million.26 The Rohingyas are ethnically and cul-
23 See generally MARTIN SMITH. BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY (1991). 
24 See RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
25 There are three different classes of Muslim people in Arakan: the Kamal, the Arakanese 
Muslim, and the Rohingya. Most or all of the refugees currently in Bangladesh are Rohingyas. 
Interview with U Kyaw La, Chairman of the Muslim Liberation Organization of Burma, in New 
York, N.V (Oct. 29, 1992). 
26 Although this figure includes many Rohingyas living in exile, primarily in Bangladesh, it 
has not been adjusted for deaths resulting from the SLORC's military campaign against the 
Rohingyas that was intensified in March 1991. RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECU-
TlON, supra note 3, at 2; SMITH, supra note 23, at 30. The total population of Burma is estimated 
to be between 39.4 and 42 million. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MYANMAR at i (1990); SMITH, supra 
note 23, at 29. 
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turally unlike the country's majority Burman ethnic group27 (which the 
SLORC consists of almost exclusively) and the majority of Arakanese. 
Like their neighbors in Bangladesh, the Rohingyas speak Bengali, 
rather than either Burmese or the Rakhine language, which is a dialect 
of Burmese.28 In addition, they are Muslims, unlike the majority of 
Burma's populace29 and unlike most Arakanese, who are Theravada 
Buddhists.30 The Rohingyas, therefore, are an ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious minority both within Burma and within their own province. 
These differences have led to such a degree of persecution in the 
past that the Rohingyas have been called Asia's "new Palestinians."31 
The most infamous case of government oppression in recent years 
occurred from 1978 to 1979, when the Burmese military began its Naga 
Min (Operation Dragon King) campaign of murder, rape, and torture 
against the Rohingya community. This campaign produced a massive 
exodus of refugees across the Naaf River into neighboring Bangla-
desh. 32 
Arakan historically has been one of Burma's many areas of unrest, 
dating back (in modern times) to the period following the Second 
World War. As Britain grudgingly relinquished control over its former 
colony,33 the country's various ethnic nationalities struggled to stake 
their claims in the newly independent land. As in other regions, rebel-
lion erupted in Arakan: Rakhine nationalists campaigned for autono-
mous statehood within Burma, while a Muslim-led faction of the same 
separatist movement pressed to establish an Islamic "frontier state" in 
the northern part of the province.34 Attempts to split the region never 
succeeded, however, and Burma's eventual 1947 Constitution failed to 
address either Rakhine demands for independent statehood or Muslim 
pleas for a separate Islamic province.35 The disparate groups in the 
27 Burmans constitute 71.3% of the country's population. Josef Silverstein, Has the World 
Forgotten Burma?, 13 CULTURAL SURVIVAL QUARTERLY, No.4, at 2, 2 (1989). 
28 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 2. 
29 Approximately 85% of Burma's people are Theravada Buddhists. BURMA TODAY, supra 
note 18, at 3. 
30 SMITH, supra note 23, at 30. 
31 Id. at 241. 
32WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 19, at 94-95. For a thorough discussion of events 
during this period, see infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
33 Burma gained independence from Britain on January 4, 1948. JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, BURMA: 
MILITARY RULE AND THE POLITICS OF STAGNATION 21 (1977). 
34 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 2; SMITH, supra note 
23, at 82. 
35 SMITH, supra note 23, at 80-82. Burma's 1947 constitution provided for the following 
composition of ethnic minority representatives in the Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Congress): 
Of the 125 seats in the Chamber of Nationalities-
(a) twenty-five seats shall be filled by representatives from the Shan State; 
(b) twelve seats shall be filled by representatives from the Kachin State; 
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Arakan region, therefore, had no representation in the fledgling Bur-
man-dominated government. 36 
In the years that followed, Muslim factions in Arakan continued 
to press, albeit unsuccessfully, for the establishment of an independent 
state. In the mid-1960s, the province was devastated economically fol-
lowing a coup d'etat in Rangoon led by General Ne Win, and many 
Arakanese (Muslim and Buddhist alike) left the poverty-stricken region 
for the more prosperous areas of the country.37 The Muslims who 
remained lived in constant fear of government persecution. Their 
status as legitimate residents was questioned by government authori-
ties, and those who lacked proof of Burmese citizenship faced uncer-
tainty over their right to remain lawfully in Burma.38 
When a census conducted by the Ne Win government from 1963 
to 1964 revealed the effects of widespread emigration from Arakan to 
other parts of Burma, officials responded by prohibiting any travel by 
Muslim Arakanese east of Akyab District (situated in the northern part 
of the state adjacent to the Bangladesh border) .39 The government 
barred Muslims from travel even between villages within a single town-
ship.40 To add to the inter-ethnic tension, the government charged the 
Rakhines with the task of enforcing the new restrictions, thus breeding 
further distrust and animosity between Muslims and Buddhists in the 
province.4l 
Soon after, the government began to designate the Rohingyas, 
whom many Burmese had regarded for years as only slightly better 
than foreigners,42 as illegal immigrants. Officials claimed that the Ro-
hingyas had crossed the border from Bangladesh unlawfully, and that 
they were troublemakers who did not belong in Burma.43 In the 1970s, 
the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) and other opposition groups (in-
(c) eight seats shall be filled by representatives from the Special Division of Chins; 
(d) three seats shall be filled by representatives from Kayah State; 
(e) fifteen seats shall be filled by representatives from the Karen State; 
(f) sixty-two seats shall be filled by representatives from the remaining territories 
of the Union of Burma. 
BURMA CaNsT. ch. XIV, 2d sched., § 87 (1947). 
36 SMITH, supra note 23, at 83. 
37 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 3. 
38 SMITH, supra note 23, at 219. 
39 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 3. 
40Id. 
41 Id. Historically, the Rohingyas and Rakhines have referred to one another demeaningly as 
Buddhist-Magh (bandit) or Muslim-Kala (foreigner), revealing the deeply ingrained ethnic preju-
dices that separate the two groups. SMITH, supra note 23, at 241. 
42 See Yokota, supra note IS, at 383-85. 
43 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 2. 
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cluding the rival Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front) formed in response 
to government oppression. Dedicated to the mujahid movement,44 the 
RPF was capable of providing weapons to several hundred devoted 
Muslim villagers living along the Naaf River, with open support from 
Bangladesh.45 The Rohingyas were unprepared, however, to confront 
a military campaign mounted by the Burmese government. 
In 1978, the Burmese army began a major offensive, referred to 
as Ye The Ha, against opposition groups in Arakan, including all Rak-
hine organizations (such as the Arakan Communist Party) as well as 
the Rohingya mujahidin.46 The army followed this offensive with the 
Naga Min operation: a campaign of murder, rape, and torture targeted 
specifically at the Muslim population, and designed to drive the "for-
eigners" out of Burma and "back to" Bangladesh. The army burned 
villages, destroyed mosques, and herded people into fenced stock-
ades.47 In April 1978, thousands began fleeing the province, and by 
midjuly more than 200,000 refugees were packed into ramshackle 
camps on the Bangladeshi side of the Naaf River. The Bangladeshi 
government did not allow any foreign diplomats or journalists to visit 
the UNHCR-supervised camps.48 
Poor, overcrowded, and ill equipped to handle the huge influx 
of refugees, Bangladesh decided that the Rohingyas must return to 
Burma. InJuly, despite vigorous opposition from within the camps, the 
Burmese government agreed on a repatriation scheme in order to 
avoid an armed conflict with Bangladeshi troopS.49 The Rohingyas, 
however, refused to leave. In response, Bangladeshi officials cut food 
supplies to the camps in an effort to persuade the refugees to go back 
home "voluntarily."50 With no provisions, the weakest Rohingyas began 
to starve. By December 1978, more than 10,000 refugees, 7000 of 
whom were children, had died.51 The UNHCR, which maintained over-
44 A mujahid is, literally, a Muslim fighter in an Islamic holy war. SMITH, supra note 23, at ix. 
45Id. at 219, 241. 
46 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 4. Ye The Ha consists 
of a "four cuts" strategy that Burmese military forces have used against rebel organizations 
throughout the country since 1962: the army attempts to cut off an insurgency group's food, 
funds, intelligence, and recruits. Id.; PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, 
at 7. 
241. 
47 PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 7; SMITH, supra note 23, at 
48 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 4. 
49Id. 
50 BANGLADESH'S ABOUT-FACE, supra note 4, at 1; RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 4. 
51 BANGLADESH'S ABOUT-FACE, supra note 4, at 1. 
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all responsibility for the relief effort, failed to challenge the Ban-
gladeshi government's coercive repatriation policy. 52 Faced with suffer-
ing and death in the camps, the refugees finally began returning to 
Burma. By the end of 1979, nearly all surviving Rohingyas were back 
in Arakan. 53 
III. THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS 
The situation in Arakan and along the Bangladeshi border today 
is strikingly similar to the situation that existed in 1978. Widespread 
religious persecution and the flagrant abuse of human rights has 
forced the current generation of Rohingyas to flee their homes and 
again seek protection in refugee camps on the opposite side of the 
Naaf River.54 The outcome of the crisis has not yet been determined, 
however, and efforts should be made now to avoid a repeat of the 
disaster that occurred fifteen years ago. 
In national elections on May 27, 1990, residents of Arakan (and 
other states throughout Burma) voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
opposition candidates, rejecting the military-backed National Unity 
Party.55 Following this widespread show of defiance, the army's cam-
paign against ethnic minorities, which had intensified in 1989, grew 
into a "routine of concerted brutality" against the Rohingyas. 56 By 1990, 
military forces effectively governed most of Arakan.57 The abuses most 
frequently perpetrated against Rohingyas by the Burmese army include 
forced labor and portering, rape, torture, religious persecution, confis-
cation of food supplies, and summary execution.58 
52 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 4. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 6--21. 
55 The Arakanese elected representatives from three parties: the National League for Democ-
racy (NLD), the Arakan League for Democracy, and the National Democratic Party for Human 
Rights. Id. at 5. The NLD, formed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in September 1988, won 72% of 
the 13 million votes cast, and 392 of the 485 legislative seats at stake in the National Assembly. 
AUNG SAN SUU KYI, supra note 20, at 267-68, 301. Mter Aung San Suu Kyi publicly criticized Ne 
Win, patriarch of Burma's military forces, however, the SLORC forced her to withdraw from the 
race for prime minister. The government has held her under house arrest in Rangoon since July 
20, 1989. Id. at 309-17. 
56 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 5; HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
BURMA, supra note 20, at 4. 
57 HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA, supra note 20, at 4. 
58U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, SOARING NUMBER OF BURMESE (ROHINGYA) REFUGEES IN 
BANGLADESH HAMPERS EFFORTS TO PROVIDE RELIEF 1 (1992) [hereinafter SOARING NUMBER]; 
RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 5; Yokota, supra note 15, at 
375-76, 383-S5. 
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In interviews with human rights and humanitarian relief groups 
conducted in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, nearly all the Rohingya 
men reported having been repeatedly forced by soldiers to leave their 
homes, for days or weeks at a time, to work for the military.59 These 
interviews revealed that the Burmese army forces many Rohingyas to 
build roads, dig canals, or work on similar projects, while others must 
carry heavy loads of food, ammunition, and supplies. Porters also must 
often walk ahead of the troops to act as "human mine sweepers."60 
Conditions are extremely harsh, as the soldiers provide little or no food 
and water, and beat those who work too slowly or fail to maintain pace. 
Laborers regularly die from starvation, fever, beatings, or exploding 
mines. The soldiers shoot and leave behind on the trail those who 
cannot work or fail to carry their burdens.61 
While the men are away, or often even when they are in the village, 
Burmese troops routinely and brutally rape Rohingya women and 
girlS.62 The women must endure repeated rapes and beatings by a 
succession of soldiers, either in their homes or at military camps where 
the army often takes them in large groups. Many women die (usually 
by bleeding to death), whereas others are simply killed outright. Those 
who survive will likely be raped again.63 
Religious persecution against the Muslim Rohingyas has increased 
drastically since 1990. The Burmese army has locked up and destroyed 
mosques and Islamic schools (usually using forced Muslim laborers), 
beaten Rohingyas at prayer, prohibited most religious activity, and 
arrested and tortured teachers and students of Islam.64 Soldiers have 
seized Rohingya homes and moved non-Muslim Burmese into the 
appropriated houses. The army has even taken agricultural lands to 
use as housing project sites for newly arrived Buddhist residents.65 
The SLORC began to insist, as previous officials had, that the 
Rohingyas were not Burmese citizens, but aliens who had crossed into 
59 See RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 6--21; Ribeiro, 
supra note 3, at 350-58. Interviews of newly arrived refugees took place in March of 1992 in five 
of the nine refugee camps that existed in Bangladesh at the time. Id. 
60 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 6--21; Ribeiro, supra 
note 3, at 350-58. 
61 See generally RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 11-15; 
HUMAN RiGHTS IN BURMA, supra note 20, at 4; SOARING NUMBER, supra note 58, at 1-2. 
62 RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 6--11; Ribeiro, supra 
note 3, at 353-58. 
63 See generally RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 6--11; 
SOARING NUMBER, supra note 58, at 2. 
64RApE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 5, 15-20. 
65Id. 
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the province illegally from Bangladesh.66 Identity cards issued to Mus-
lims, without which they were forbidden to travel, designated them as 
"foreigners. "67 In many cases, Burmese soldiers ordered Rohingyas to 
produce their identity cards and other citizenship materials, and then 
confiscated or destroyed the documents before their eyes.68 Numerous 
refugees have reported being told by the army that they were "Ban-
gladeshis," and should "go home."69 The government campaign has 
been directed toward displacing the Muslims from their homes, taking 
their property, destroying their resistance, denying their proof of citi-
zenship, and then forcing them out of the country. The sheer numbers 
of Rohingyas who have fled from Arakan attest to the success of the 
SLORC's policy. 
In the Cox's Bazaar district of Bangladesh, conditions in the 
fifteen camps that hold Rohingyas have steadily grown worse. When 
the refugees first began to arrive in 1990, the Bangladeshi government 
welcomed them, offered them support, and requested international 
cooperation to provide them with emergency assistance. 7o As Ro-
hingyas continued to arrive, however, sometimes by the thousands each 
day, officials attempted to reach an agreement with the SLORC that 
would provide for expedited repatriation. Faced with domestic pres-
sures, limited resources, and scrutiny in the international media, Bang-
ladesh's government became increasingly unwilling to care for the 
growing tide of refugees.71 Finally, in February 1992, Bangladeshi 
officials appealed to the international community for aid, and invited 
the UNHCR to assess the situation and to try to stop the influx of 
Rohingyas.72 
66 See Yokota, supra note 15, at 368-70. Ohn Gyaw, Burma's Minister of Foreign Affairs, has 
insisted that "it is a rubbish thing that people have left Myanmar. These people who are in the 
refugee camps in Bangladesh are perhaps from Dhaka, but not one single person has left Burma." 
Id. at 369. 
A Burmese citizenship law passed by Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) in 1982 
provides full citizenship only to those able to prove that ancestors of both parents were living in 
Burma prior to the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824. RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECU-
TION, supra note 3, at 3. Approximately 10% of the country's population cannot satisJY this 
requirement, and the law regards such people as third-class citizens at best Id. The BSPP enacted 
the law, in place of a less restrictive 1947 statute, following the return of Rohingyas from 
Bangladesh in 1978. Designed to isolate Muslim, Chinese, and Indian people, the law denies 
them the right to hold national party positions, to attend institutes of higher education, or to 
serve in the military or police forces. Id.; PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 
7, at 5 n.ll. 
67 See RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 4. 
68Id. at 6. 
69 Id. at 15-20; Historical Facts about Rohingyas, NEW NATION (Dhaka), Apr. 23, 1992, at A6. 
70 BANGLADESH'S ABoUT-FACE, supra note 4, at 1. 
71 Id.; SOARING NUMBER, supra note 58, at 2. 
72 SOARING NUMBER, supra note 58, at 2. 
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On March 24, 1992, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali issued a press release stating that the "tragic situation" in Burma, 
if not urgently addressed, would "threaten the stability of the region 
and increase human suffering. "73 In early April, Boutros-Ghali dis-
patched Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Under Secretary-General for Hu-
manitarian Affairs, to Bangladesh and Burma in an attempt to obtain 
a negotiated settlement of the refugee crisis.74 On April 28, 1992, with 
the assistance of Ambassador Eliasson, the Burmese foreign minister 
and his counterpart from Bangladesh signed an agreement providing 
for repatriation of the refugees. 75 The plan called for the "safe and 
voluntary" return of 5000 persons a day over a period of six months. 76 
Bangladesh offered to assist Burmese officials by registering Rohingyas 
in the camps and determining who among them carried "evidence of 
residence" in Burma.77 Burmese officials, however, agreed to admit 
only those individuals who could give "bona fide evidence of their 
residence in Myanmar" through official government documentation.78 
The SLORC also refused to' allow monitoring by the UNHCR of the 
refugees' safety once they were back inside Burma.79 
The UNHCR immediately withdrew its support for the agree-
ment,80 and the international community demanded that repatriations 
not begin until U.N. observers could ensure the refugees' "safe and 
voluntary" return.8! Rohingyas inside the camps responded immedi-
ately by protesting the repatriation plan, but the demonstrations ended 
when Bangladeshi troops fired on a group of about 2000 refugees, 
73 Press Release, U.N Secretary-General Calls far International Suppart to UNHCR to Help 
Bangladesh Cope with Refugee Flow; Asks Myanmar to Rectify Causes of Tragic Situation (MaL 6, 
1992), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 305, 
74 PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 15; U.N. Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, Press Briefing Concerning Refugees in the Region of Burma (Apr. 16, 1992), in DEMOC-
RACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 307-09. The Rohingya situation is an important 
issue for the United Nations, as it is the first case to be addressed by the new post of Humanitarian 
Mfairs. PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 15. 
75 The SLORC agreed to "take all necessary measures that would halt the outflow of Myanmar 
residents to Bangladesh and encourage those who had left Myanmar to return voluntarily and 
safely to their homes." joint Statements, supra note 8, at 310-11. 
76Id. at 311; PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 15. 
77 PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 15. 
78 joint Statements, supra note 8, at 311. Among those permitted to return were refugees 
"carrying Myanmar Citizenship Identity Cards/National Registration Cards; those able to present 
any other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities; and all those persons able to furnish 
evidence of their residence of Myanmar, such as addresses or any other relevant particulars." Id. 
79 USCR URGES CAUTION, supra note 8, at 1. 
80 See Foa, supra note 10, at 312-13; CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
81 USCR URGES CAUTION, supra note 8, at 1-2; Press Release, U.S. Department of State, 
Statement on Burmese Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh (Dec. 24, 1992), at 1. 
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killing one and injuring twenty.82 The Burmese and Bangladeshi gov-
ernments quickly suspended the planned repatriations indefinitely.83 
In the months that followed, Rohingyas in the camps continued 
to oppose Bangladesh's efforts to accelerate the repatriation process.84 
Many refugees reportedly took up arms, and violent clashes between 
residents and government officials occurred inside several camps.85 At 
the same time, Bangladesh imposed further restrictive measures to 
suppress opposition and to encourage the Rohingyas to leave the 
country.86 In Burma, reports of atrocities in Arakan continued, and the 
SLORC repeated its unwillingness to allow UNHCR involvement in the 
repatriation process.87 
On September 22, 1992, Bangladesh began secretly returning 
Rohingyas to Arakan.88 Many Rohingyas reportedly refused to return 
to Burma unless the SLORC agreed to allow United Nations monitors 
to supervise the repatriation and resettlement process, and further 
conflicts between Bangladeshi police and residents of the camps en-
sued.89 The UNHCR announced on December 23, 1992 that Bangla-
82 CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 9. 
83Id. at 8-9. 
84For example, on July 14, 1992, police reportedly fired into the crowd after refugees hit 
them with rocks in an attempt to stop a head count in the camp. Up to six refugees were killed. 
Qadir, supra note 11, at AI. On August 17, 1992, police again opened fire at a meeting between 
refugees and government officials, reportedly killing up to 10 refugees. CHANGES IN BURMA?, 
supra note 8, at 9. 
85 Insurgency groups from within Burma, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and 
the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, reportedly supplied the refugees with weapons. Id. at 9; 
Burma Militants Attack Refugee Camp Officials, NATION (Bangkok), Sept. 1, 1992, at AI. 
86 Bangladesh has assigned armed police to "provide security" at the camps, erected barbed 
wire barriers, reduced daily food rations, slowed construction of shelter, blocked plans to improve 
sanitation (and thus prevent the spread of disease), and denied additional humanitarian groups 
permission to join the relief effort. Qadir, supra note 11, at AI; CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 
8, at 9; BANGLADESH'S ABouT-FACE, supra note 4, at 1. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum 
Khaleda Zia told the U.S. Department of State in September 1992 that her country wanted "an 
early and safe return of the refugees," but indicated that "it [would] not be possible for us to 
sustain the burden of refugees for a long time." Press Release, Asia Watch (Dec. 30, 1992), at 2 
[hereinafter Asia Watch Press Release]. 
87 CHANGES IN BURMA?, supra note 8, at 11. 
88 Asia Watch Press Release, supra note 86, at 1-2. The UNHCR reported that Bangladesh 
repatriated nearly 1000 Rohingyas on November 25, 1992, some of them involuntarily. Id. 
89 On December 6, 1992, hundreds of police stormed a camp, seized more than 6000 
weapons, and arrested 14 Burmese Muslim rebels who the police deemed "terrorists." Bangladeshi 
Police Raid Burmese Refugee Camp, Reuters, Dec. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter 
File. Refugees contradicted the police allegations, stating that "camp officials wanted ... volun-
teers for repatriation. But [the refugees] refused, saying nobody wants to return. That's why the 
police arrested them." Burmese Muslim Refugees Suspicious of Repatriation, UPI, Dec. 7, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Interviewees also reported that most of the refugees 
repatriated so fur had either been bribed or forced to return. Id. Rohingyas in the camps have 
1994] BURMA'S REFUGEES IN CRISIS 313 
desh had returned more than 4000 persons to Burma, thereby violat-
ing the Bangladeshi authorities' pledge of "strict adherence to the 
principle of voluntary repatriation. "90 In addition, the UNHCR stopped 
screening refugees because Bangladesh denied agency personnel free 
access to the camps to conduct confidential interviews.91 
On January 20, 1993, Bangladesh temporarily suspended repatria-
tions and began negotiating with Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, to reestablish UNHCR participation in the repa-
triation proceedings.92 Prior to the hiatus, Bangladesh had returned 
more than 17,000 Rohingyas to Arakan, at least some of them involun-
tarily.93 Nine days later, Bangladeshi and UNHCR officials reached an 
agreement on renewed United Nations supervision of repatriation 
efforts, which resumed on February 1.94 Bangladesh's foreign minister 
declared that "[a]ll hindrances and misunderstandings on the refugee 
problems have been removed," and reaffirmed "the sincerity of Bang-
ladesh and its firm policy toward voluntary repatriation. "95 The 
UNHCR pledged full cooperation with the repatriation process.96 
Burma's dictators, however, persistently refused to permit the UNHCR 
or any other group to monitor the repatriation and resettlement of 
Rohingyas in Arakan.97 
In May 1993, High Commissioner Ogata executed a formal Memo-
randum of Understanding with Bangladeshi officials, which included 
an agreement on the safe and voluntary return ofRohingyas to Burma, 
UNHCR access to the camps in Bangladesh, and international assis-
complained that Bangladeshi police threaten them if they attempt to voice their fear to UNHCR 
personnel of being forcibly returned. Camp officials have denied the allegations. Id. 
90 Press Release, United Nations, Bangladesh Urged to Halt Coerced Returns, REF /1006 (Dec. 
23, 1992) [hereinafter Bangladesh Urged]. 
91 Id. Denial of access violates the April 28, 1992 agreement between Burma and Bangladesh, 
which provided for UNHCR involvement in the repatriation process. Asia Watch Press Release, 
supra note 86, at l;joint Statements, supra note 8, at 311. 
92A Bangladeshi official announced that "[w]e have agreed in principle to take a breather 
until January 25. By that time we hope to bring the UNHCR back into the repatriation process." 
Bangladesh Says Eager to Settle Rnw with UNHCR, Reuters,Jan. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Reuter File. Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman added: "How ... the refugees could 
be sent home in a shortest possible time is our main concern." Id. 
93Id. 
94 Rohingya Repatriation Resumes, NATION (Bangkok), Feb. 1, 1993, at A4. Bangladesh re-
turned a group of 981 refugees to Burma on February 1, 1993, bringing the total number of 
returnees to 18,120, according to officials of the UNHCR. Refugees Return to Burma, BANGKOK 
POST, Feb. 1, 1993, atA3. 
95 Bangladesh Repatriation to Continue, NATION (Bangkok), Feb. 5, 1993, at A4. 
96 UNHCR. Team to Visit Burmese Refugees, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 5, 1993, atA3. 
97 Asia Watch Press Release, supra note 86, at 1. 
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tance to returnees.98 On November 5, 1993, a UNHCR representative 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SLORC, guarantee-
ing the United Nations agency access to those refugees who return to 
Arakan.99 Although this agreement represents an important step in 
securing safe repatriation and resettlement for the refugees, the inter-
national community must maintain a vigilant watch over the SLORC's 
activities in Arakan. As historical events have illustrated, the Rohingyas 
are a target for abuse by the dictators in Rangoon. 
IV. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 
Like all other nations, Burma and Bangladesh are legally obli-
gated to respect and safeguard the fundamental human rights of per-
sons within their borders, regardless of whether they are citizens or 
refugees. IOO This Note now examines applicable principles of interna-
tional refugee, human rights, and humanitarian law, both as stipulated 
by treaty and as established under customary international law. 
Although discussion of the law relating to refugees is broken down 
into four seemingly distinct categories-refugee law, human rights law, 
humanitarian law, and customary international law-this division is 
utilized almost exclusively for purposes of analysis. In addressing inter-
national refugee issues, it is essential to recognize the need for inte-
gration of the various sources of law in this area. Refugee organiza-
tions, human rights groups, state governments, and international 
agencies should draw from all available sources to accomplish the goals 
of refugee protection, temporary asylum, voluntary repatriation and 
resettlement, or permanent asylum in a third country. The refugee and 
human rights divisions of the United Nations have acknowledged this 
need for greater integration. 101 The High Commissioner for Refugees 
recently declared that "a refugee movement is a grave human rights 
issue, ... [and] human rights institutions and organizations should be 
utilized more actively and effectively by States, as well as by concerned 
98 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (May 1993) [hereinafter 
Memorandum of Understanding], in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 412-15. 
99The memorandum provides that the "UNHCR will be given access to all returnees; that 
the returnees will be issued with the appropriate identification papers and that the returnees will 
enjoy the same freedom of movement as all other nationals." HUMAN RiGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, 
supra note 1, at 12. 
100 See infra notes 133-57 and accompanying text. 
101 See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTS, THE HUMAN RiGHTS OF REFUGEES 
AND DISPLACED PERSONS: PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND DISPLACED 
PERSONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTS, HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE LAw 3-5 (1991) 
[hereinafter PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES]. 
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refugee organizations to address the human rights concerns in refugee 
situations. "102 
A. Refugee Law 
To resolve the refugee crisis that existed in Europe after World 
War II, international refugee law was designed to identify persons 
fleeing persecution in their homeland and to provide them with the 
protection of the world community.103 Over the nearly half-century 
since the international community first addressed the problems of 
refugees, many different nations have executed numerous agreements, 
to the extent that modern refugee law represents the "codification in 
treaty form of international norms governing the status and protection 
of refugees. "104 
The most far-reaching instruments to address the plight and de-
fense of refugees are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (the Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (the Refu-
gee Protocol).105 Founded on the principle of nonrefoulement,106 inter-
national refugee conventions focus on protecting refugees from forc-
ible return to a place-usually the region or state they fled-where 
they would likely face further harm or persecution. 107 Although the law 
is applied somewhat differently in individual cases than in mass invol-
untary movements,IOB principles relating to individual refugees offer a 
logical point of departure for this inquiry. 
1. "Convention" Refugees and "Humanitarian" Refugees 
A "refugee" is defined in the Refugee Convention and Refugee 
Protocol as any person who "owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
102 Note on International Protection to General Assembly, V.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 41st Sess., at 8-9, V.N. Doc. 
A/AC.96j750 (1990). 
103See Ved P. Nanda, Refugee Law and Policy, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL 
AND V.S. RESPONSES 3 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989) [hereinafter REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY]. 
104 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 2. 
105 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28,1951,19 V.S.T. 
6259, 189 V.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, openedfor signatureJan. 31,1967,19 V.S.T. 6223, 606 V.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee 
Protocol]; see EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 294 (1991). 
106 Nonrefoulement is a technical term, derived from Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, 
for protection against return to a country "where [the refugee's] life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion." THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 704 (2d ed. 1991). 
107 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 3. 
108This issue is discussed further at infra notes 183-212 and accompanying text. 
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particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country .... "109 The evolution of 
refugee law reflects, to a limited degree, the changing reality of refugee 
crises throughout the world. Since the 1940s, when the international 
community developed the early legal approaches to address individual 
cases of persecution, international treaties and national policies have 
acknowledged the unique problems caused by mass involuntary move-
ments of people striving to escape armed conflict or general human 
rights abuses. Traditional laws and strategies were particularly ill suited 
to address the growing problem of large-scale influxes of refugees 
seeking protection and temporary asylumYo Such refugees worldwide 
now outnumber those who meet the individualized persecution defini-
tion, so-called "Convention" refugees. lll 
The Refugee Convention of 1951 authorized and directed the 
Office of the UNHCR to seek, with the cooperation of involved states, 
international protection for refugees and permanent solutions to their 
problems. ll2 Since its inception in 1950,113 however, the UNHCR's role 
has evolved and expanded. Beyond requiring merely that protection 
be provided to those able to demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that 
109 Refugee Convention, supra note 105, art. 1; Refugee Protocol, supra note 105, art. 1; see 
also LAWSON, supra note 105, at 1277. 
110 See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 103, at 9. As originally drafted, refugee law "fails to provide 
adequate protection to those individuals and especially to those groups who do not meet the 
persecution standard [of the Refugee Convention), but flee serious instability, disturbances, or 
armed conflicts and are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin." Id. 
III Id. As former High Commissioner Jean-Pierre Hocke commented in 1986, "[t)he vast 
majority of today's refugees and asylum seekers do not always correspond to the formal definition 
of a refugee provided for in the 1951 convention." LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTS, 
THE UNHCR AT 40: REFUGEE PROTECTION AT THE CROSSROADS 53 (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR 
AT 40); see also Kay Hailbronner, Nonrefoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary 
International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, in THE NEW AsYLUM SEEKERS: REFuGEE LAW IN 
THE 1980s, at 123 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) [hereinafter NEW AsYLUM SEEKERS). 
112The preamble of the Refugee Convention provides that "the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing 
for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-<>rdination of measures taken 
to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-<>peration of States with the High Commis-
sioner ... ." Refugee Convention, supra note 105, pmbl. 
The Refugee Protocol requires that states "undertake to co-<>perate with the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... [including providing the Office with 
information concerning) (a) the condition of refugees; (b) the implementation of the present 
Protocol; (c) laws, regulations and decrees which are ... in force relating to refugees." Refugee 
Protocol, supra note 105, art. 2. 
113 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA. Res. 
428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter 
UNHCR Statute). 
1994] BURMA'S REFUGEES IN CRISIS 317 
they meet the ''well-founded fear of persecution" standard, the 
UNHCR's mandate now includes protection for mass migrations of 
people fleeing war or widespread human rights abuses at home.1I4 
Persons meeting this description have come to be called "humanitarian 
refugees" or "temporary asylum seekers," as distinguished from so-
called "Convention" refugees who satisfY the individualized refugee 
definition.ll5 Because the Rohingyas in Bangladesh are properly char-
acterized as humanitarian refugees, or seekers of temporary asylum, 
this analysis will concentrate on the legal protections applicable to such 
refugees. 
The UNHCR is authorized to provide relief, absent a determina-
tion of individual refugee status, if a host country invites repre-
sentatives of the agency to assist a particular refugee population.1I6 
Nations party to the Refugee Protocol may also refer disputes concern-
ing either the interpretation or application of the Convention and the 
Protocol to the International Court ofJustice. ll7 
In addition to defining who is a "refugee," the Refugee Conven-
tion stipulates that countries must safeguard the basic human rights of 
refugees within their control, without discrimination by race, religion, 
or national origin.ns The rights most of concern to humanitarian 
refugees and temporary asylum-seekers relate to religious freedom,1I9 
property,120 freedom of association,121 welfare,122 administrative assis-
114 Refugees within the High Commissioner's jurisdiction include "persons who have fled 
their home country due to armed conflicts, internal turmoil and situations involving gross and 
systematic violations of human rights." Note on International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 36th Sess., para. 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/660 (1985); see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New 
Asylum Seekers, in NEW AsYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 111, at 103-21; UNHCR AT 40, supra note 
Ill, at 52-56. 
115 See Hailbronner, supra note lll, at 123-58. Civilians fleeing generalized violence triggered 
by internal armed conflict, and who desire temporary refuge in a third country, are legally distinct 
from those seeking permanent asylum in a foreign state. Id.; see also Joan F. Hartman, The Principle 
and Practice of Temporary Refuge: A Customary Norm Protecting Civilians Fleeing Internal Armed 
Conflict, in NEW AsYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 111, at 87-101. 
116Jeffrey Dillman, International Refugee and Asylum Law, 34 How. LJ. 50, 53-54 (1991). 
The UNHCR is authorized not only to provide temporary protection and assistance, but also to 
grant refugee status "without an individual determination as to whether each person [meets] the 
refugee definition." Id. 
117Refugee Protocol, supra note 105, art. 4; PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFuGEES, supra note 
101, at 9. 
118Refugee Convention, supra note 105, arts. 1,3; see also LAWSON, supra note 105, at 294. 
119Refugee Convention, supra note 105, art. 4. 
120Id. arts. 13-17. 
121Id. art. 15. 
122Id. arts. 20-24 (providing for rationing of scarce products, housing, public education, and 
public relief). 
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tance,123 and freedom of movement. 124 The UNHCR's primary duty is 
to provide international protection and material assistance to refu-
gees. 125 To accomplish these goals, the UNHCR is required by statute 
to promote refugee admission, assist in voluntary repatriation efforts, 
supervise the application of international refugee conventions, and 
promote any other measures designed to better the refugees' situation 
or reduce the number in need of protection.126 
2. Nonrefoulement in the Refugee Convention 
The most important provision of the Refugee Convention is Arti-
cle 33(1),127 which provides that "[nlo Contracting State shall expel or 
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. "128 While this definition of nonrefoule-
ment articulates an extremely important guarantee, it suffers from two 
basic shortcomings. First, Article 33 is binding only on signatories to 
the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Second, the article fails to grant 
a specific right to asylum from persecution.129 Neither Burma nor 
Bangladesh has signed the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol. 130 
A legally binding guarantee of asylum is critical for the majority of 
123 Id. art. 25. 
124Id. art. 26. 
125 Nanda, supra note 103, at 3--19. 
126UNHCR Statute, supra note 113, ch. II, para. 8. 
127 As one commentator has declared, "lilt may be safely submitted that Article 33 of the 
1951 Convention has played a principal part in the development of the principle of non-refoule-
ment and that, as such, it constitutes the most important part of international refugee law." 
GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT 268 (1989). 
128 Refugee Convention, supra note 105, art. 33(1). 
129Western countries that participated in the drafting of the Refugee Convention explicitly 
rejected a right to asylum, even though such protection was already included in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 19, at 15. Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 
217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). An effort by the United Nations in 1977 to correct 
the omission, by drafting an internationally binding convention on the right to asylum, failed. 
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 19, at 15. 
130 Id. at 108. Under norms of customary international law, however, refugees who arrive in 
states not party to the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol deserve the same protections 
extended to those who arrive in signatory countries. See infra notes 165-212 and accompanying 
text. 
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today's refugees who, like the Rohingyas, have been forced to flee 
armed conflict or widespread human rights abuses. 
To meet the demands of a broader class of modern refugees, the 
principle of nonrejoulement-like the definition of who is a "refugee"-
has been expanded by state practice beyond the limits of Article 33.131 
Persons fleeing internal strife who have been denied protection by 
their own government, so-called "humanitarian" refugees, have a right 
not to be returned to their country of origin for as long as hostilities 
continue and their personal safety is at risk.132 
B. Human Rights Law 
Emphasizing the "inherent dignity" and "equal and inalienable 
rights" of all people, and urging "promotion of universal respect for 
... human rights and fundamental freedoms, "133 international human 
rights law expands on the limited protections available to temporary 
asylum seekers under traditional refugee law. Whereas refugee law, as 
codified, is narrow in scope and focuses on individual cases of perse-
cution and abuse, the tenets of human rights law are broadly drafted 
and very aspirational,l34 Human rights law applies to all persons, in-
cluding refugees, seekers of temporary asylum, and displaced per-
sons.135 
The United Nations Charter provides the primary legal source for 
many subsequent human rights conventions and agreements,136 and it 
is the principal international document that both Burma and Bangla-
desh have signed.137 The Charter requires member countries to work 
individually and jointly to promote higher living standards, solutions 
m See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text. 
132 Hailbronner, supra note 111, at 105. Additionally, many commentators have argued for 
expansion of nonrefoulement under international human rights or humanitarian guidelines, main-
taining that the concept can now be considered a norm of customary international law. This is 
discussed in further detail at infra notes 165-212 and accompanying text. 
133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 129, pmbl. 
134 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 129. 
135 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 2. 
136U.N. CHARTER arts. 68-72. Article 68 of the Charter, for example, provides that "[t]he 
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions ... for the promotion of human rights 
.... " Id. art. 68. 
137 Upon joining the United Nations, both countries signed the U.N. Charter, thereby un-
dertaking to uphold and promote its obligatory provisions. Burma signed the Charter and 
became a member of the United Nations on April 19, 1948. Bangladesh signed and gained 
membership on September 17, 1974. MJ. BOWMAN & DJ. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: 
INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 113-14 (1984) & 130 (Supp. 1992). Under Article 4, signatories 
must formally pledge to abide by the Charter's requirements. U.N. CHARTER art. 4. 
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to international humanitarian problems, and universal respect for 
human rights, without discrimination on account of race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion. 138 
The principal document in this area of law is the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, "a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations," which sets forth many of the basic canons of 
international law. 139 The significance of the Universal Declaration for 
refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons "lies in the fact that it 
aims at unconditional guarantees in contrast to the limited or condi-
tional guarantees under refugee or humanitarian law."140 The statutes 
and policies of any single sovereignty, therefore, cannot restrict human 
rights laws applicable to refugees.141 In addition, the Universal Decla-
ration recognizes a broader general right to asylum than the one set 
forth in the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol.142 Unfortu-
nately, the instrument is neither a constitutional document nor a 
legally binding treaty, and-absent state cooperation and compli-
ance-its principles lack legal effect. 143 Although member states have 
138U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56. Article 56 provides that "[a]ll members pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56; see also Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees under 
International Humanitarian Law, in REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY, supra note 103, at 33,34. 
139 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 129. 
140 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 12. Several provisions of the Uni-
versal Declaration apply to refugees in general, and are relevant to the Rohingyas' situation in 
particular: 
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; 
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person; 
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; 
Article 13.2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country; 
Article 14.1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution; 
Article 17. Everyone has the right to own property .... No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property; 
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
. . . [and] to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 
Universal Declaration, supra note 129. 
141 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 12. 
142Article 14 of the Universal Declaration provides that "[e]veryone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." Universal Declaration, supra note 129, 
art. 14(1). In contrast, the right to asylum in the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol is 
restricted to those individuals persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion. Refugee Convention, supra note 105, 
art. 33; Refugee Protocol, supra note 105. 
143 See PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 13-14. 
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pledged to work toward achievement of the document's aspirational 
goals simply by joining the United Nations,144 the lack of enforcement 
power greatly decreases the Universal Declaration's value in an actual 
refugee crisis. 
The United Nations adopted two other instruments in 1966 to 
effectuate the Universal Declaration's aspirational recommendations: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights145 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 146 
States that are party to the Covenants are legally bound by each docu-
ment's terms, including the provisions relating to refugee protection.147 
Both Burma and Bangladesh have signed the U.N. Charter,148 
thereby pledging to achieve "the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms" as set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.149 Neither state, 
however, has signed the two Conventions that further detail the Uni-
versal Declaration's principles.150 Nonetheless, SLORC officials have 
admitted the existence of their obligations under the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration more than once. l5l 
Several other international documents contain terms that pertain 
to the rights of refugees, such as the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979),152 the Conven-
144 See Rudy Guyon, Violent Repression in Burma: Human Rights and the Global Response, 10 
UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 409, 430 (1992). 
145 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Among other safeguards, the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights prohibits unlawful expulsion; and guarantees ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, practice their own religion, and use 
their own language. Id. arts. 13,27. 
146 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights grants, inter alia, the right to work, to enjoy an adequate 
standard of living, and to take part in the cultural life of a community. Id. arts. 6, 11, 15. 
147LAWSON, supra note 105, at 957. 
148 See supra note 137. 
149Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 129, pmbl. 
150 BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 137, at 303-{)5 (1984) & 181-82 (Supp. 1992). 
151 According to the SLORC, Burma has "no quarrel with the principle of genuine respect 
for human rights, within the general guidelines set by the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Statement of U Aung Thant, Observer for Burma, U.N. 
ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., 47th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/SR.47 (1989); see 
also Guyon, supra note 144, at 430; Press Release No. 1/93, Permanent Mission of the Union of 
Myanmar to the U.N., Address l!y the National Convention Convening Commission Chairman 
Maj.-Gen. Myo Nyunt on opening Day of the National Convention Oan. 11, 1993). 
152 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 
180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979) [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
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tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (1984),153 the Body of Principles for the Protec-
tion of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention (1988),154 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) .155 In 1991, under pres-
sure from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Burma 
signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 156 
Neither SLORC leaders nor Bangladeshi authorities, however, have 
signed most of these international treaties.157 
C. Humanitarian Law 
Humanitarian agreements, such as the Geneva Conventions of 
1949158 and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,159 
primarily shield civilian noncombatants who have been displaced by 
armed conflict. 160 The Geneva Conventions provide widely accepted 
rules prohibiting violence to physical and mental well-being, torture, 
153 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 
E/CnA/1984/72 (1984), entered into force June 26,1987 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
154 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988). 
155 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989. 
156 Burma signed the Convention on July 15,1991. BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 137, at 
82--84 (Supp. 1992). Bangladesh signed the Convention on August 3, 1990. Id. The Convention 
includes a provision committing governments to monitor progress toward full application of the 
Convention's principles, and to report back to the United Nations on progress toward, inter alia, 
special protection of children worldwide and improvement of children's situation worldwide 
through development and education in conditions of peace and security. PROPOSAL FOR CON-
STRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 14; LAwSON, supra note 105, at 287. 
157 Neither Burma nor Bangladesh has signed the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol. 
BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 137, at 171-72, 306-07 (1984) & 144-45, 182 (Supp. 1992). 
Bangladesh signed CEDAW on November 6, 1984; Burma is not a party to CEDAW. Id. at 448-49 
(1984) & 244 (Supp. 1992). Neither country has signed the Torture Convention. Id. at 82-84 
(Supp. 1992). Whether they have signed these instruments or not, the governments of Burma 
and Bangladesh are obligated under principles of customary international law to protect citizens 
and noncitizens alike from murder, torture, degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary de-
tention, and racial discrimination. See infra notes 165-212 and accompanying text 
158 Conventions for the Protection of War Victims Concerning: I. Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; II. Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; III. Treatment of Prisoners 
of War; and IV. Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.s.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S.31 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions of 1949]. 
159Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Protocol II, Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I and II (1977), entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 
160 PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, at 3. 
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mutilation or other cruel treatment, murder, and outrages against 
personal dignity such as rape or indecent assault. 161 In addition, civilian 
noncombatants have a legal right to humanitarian assistance,162 as well 
as a humanitarian right of nonrefoulement and its corresponding guar-
antee of temporary asylum. 163 Burma has signed the Geneva Conven-
tions, albeit without the two important protocols relating to the pro-
tection of victims of international and internal armed conflicts. 164 
D. Customary International Law 
Treaty law, although extensive, fails to address many issues of 
concern to the international community, such as the protection of 
persons in refugee-type situations who do not satisfy the Refugee Con-
vention's individualized persecution definition. 165 Additionally, many 
states are not party to the various existing agreements, including those 
that pertain to human rights. The governments of Burma and Bangla-
desh have not signed most of the instruments relating to refugee, 
human rights, and humanitarian principles. 166 In order to locate legal 
protections for refugees in states not party to the international conven-
tions of refugee, human rights, and humanitarian law, our inquiry 
must turn to relevant provisions of customary international law. 
Custom is often called upon to fill the gaps that exist in codified 
international law, "supplementing treaty rules and having the potential 
to reach out more generally to regulate parties in their international 
161 See Article 3 of the Conventions, which has been ratified by all but two states. Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, supra note 158, art. 3; PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, 
at 9. 
162The right to humanitarian assistance is mentioned repeatedly in the Geneva Conventions. 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 158; Parker, supra note 138, at 37. 
163 Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits countries that have received persons 
fleeing armed conflict from sending the refugees back while fighting continues. Fourth Geneva 
Convention 0[1949, supra note 158, art. 45. "[P]eople have a right to temporary refuge until the 
situation in their country of origin changes. In the case of war refugees, change means the 
cessation of hostilities." Parker, supra note 138, at 38. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, along with the Genocide Convention of 1948, "are con-
sidered today as the core of the contemporary humanitarian law of war in force." G.LA.D. Draper, 
The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in HENRI DUNANT INSTITUTE, UNESCO, 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 6, 6 (1988). 
164 PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 17. 
165There are more than 16 million refugees in the world today. WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, 
supra note 19, at 33. The majority fail to meet the Refugee Convention's individualized persecu-
tion definition, and are variously referred to as "humanitarian" refugees, seekers of temporary 
asylum, or displaced persons. Id. at 32-34. Such individuals are not protected under codified 
refugee law, even if the country to which they have fled is a signatory to international refugee 
conventions. Hailbronner, supra note lll, at 123. 
166 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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relations."167 According to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, customary international law is the general practice of states 
accepted as law,168 and "embodies those general and consistent state 
practices which states follow from a sense of legal obligation. "169 This 
obligation derives from the expectations of individuals who reside 
within the many disparate nations that make up the international 
community, and is manifested as a dynamic process that produces an 
ever-changing body of legal principles.170 Although regarded as a sec-
ondary source of international law, after established treaty rules, cus-
tom is more generally applicable to state practices than are the inter-
national agreements executed by government or party officials.171 
Customary international law arises from patterns of practice or 
behavior among states and patterns of shared legal expectations--
opinio juris. The latter derives from the expectations of all "human-
kind," not merely from the practices of "official State elites."I72 More-
over, the patterns of expectation that are the source of opinio juris 
need not enjoy universal consent, but "need only be generally shared 
in the international community."173 Whereas countries that have not 
signed international conventions can legitimately claim not to be 
bound by the instruments' terms, all states are required to comply with 
the dictates of customary international law. 174 
Certain elements of customary international law do not rest upon 
either shared patterns of behavior or generally accepted legal expec-
tations, but are recognized as jus cogens. 175 Jus cogens, or "compelling 
law," is "a sort of international law that, once ensconced, cannot be 
displaced by states, either in their treaties or in their practice. "176 In 
167 Mark W.Janis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 36 (1988). 
168 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b). Done at San Francisco, June 
26, 1945 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter IC] Statute l. 
169Guyon, supra note 144, at 433-34. 
170 See Jordan]. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of 
the United States, 12 MICH.]. INT'L L. 59, 59-62 (1990). 
171 SeeJANIs, supra note 167, at 36-37. The Statute of the International Court of Justice ranks 
international custom second, after international agreements, "as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law." IC] Statute, supra note 168, art. 38(1) (b);JANIS, supra note 167, at 36. 
172 Paust, supra note 170, at 61. Paust maintains that "[tlhe expectations of all human beings 
(,mankind,' 'the world,' 'the people') are not only relevant but they also provide the ultimate 
criterial referent" for opinio juris. Id. at 62. 
173Id. at 63. 
174 Notwithstanding this requirement, "any state indicating dissent during development" of 
a rule of customary international law is not bound by that rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 reporters' note 12 (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENTl. 
175Jus cogens is comprised of peremptory norms of international law, which prevail in any 
conflict of international law or agreements. Id. § 102 cmt. k. 
176JANIS, supra note 167, at 53-54. 
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the area of human rights, the law has identified a number of specific 
principles as jus cogens, peremptory norms of conduct from which no 
deviation is allowed. Hence, a nation may be held to be in breach of 
inviolable standards of customary international law if it practices, en-
courages, or condones: "(a) genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) 
the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; (d) torture or 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (e) 
prolonged arbitrary detention; or (f) systematic racial discrimina-
tion."177 These fundamental violations of individual physical integrity 
are legally prohibited even if sanctioned by international agreements 
or by a country's positive law.178 
Whereas the practices listed in (a) through (f) are, by definition, 
"gross" violations of human rights even if committed singly or infre-
quently, various other acts breach customary law if perpetrated regu-
larly and in accordance with state policy. Thus, a country also violates 
international law if it practices, encourages, or condones "(g) a consis-
tent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights. "179 Among the abuses deemed "gross" if carried out as part of a 
consistent pattern are systematic harassment, invasions of the privacy of 
the home, denial of the right to return to one's country, mass uproot-
ing of a country's population, denial of freedom of conscience and 
religion, and invidious racial or religious discrimination. ISO Burma's 
military junta has systematically committed each of these violations in 
army operations directed against the Rohingyas of Arakan. 1S1 
E. N onrefoulement and Temporary Refuge 
The body of customary international law relating to refugees, 
temporary asylum seekers, and displaced persons derives from a com-
bination of the international agreements and United Nations conven-
tions discussed above, the general practice and behavior of states, and 
the shared legal expectations of all people, including refugees and 
177RESTATEMENT, supra note 174, § 702 (a)-(f) . 
178 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Note, "The United States-China Act of 1991" and Customary 
International Law, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 257, 264 (1993). One commentator has noted that 
the reporters of the Restatement, in compiling this list of fundamentally protected human rights, 
have "selected only those rights, as recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
'whose status as customary law is generally accepted ... and whose scope and content are 
generally agreed.'" Richard B. Lillich, The Customary International Law of Human Rights in the 
Revised Restatement, 89 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 84,85 (1985). 
179RESTATEMENT, supra note 174, § 702(g) cmt. m. "Consistent pattern of gross violations" 
generally refers to violations of those rights that are universally accepted and that no government 
would admit to violating as state policy. Id. § 702 reporters' note 10. 
180Id. § 702 cmt. m. 
181 See generally RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3. 
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persons in refugee-type situations.182 Principal among the relevant cus-
tomary laws are the right of nonrejoulement and the right of temporary 
refuge. Commentators generally agree that nonrefoulement is presently 
considered a peremptory norm of customary internationallaw,183 and 
that temporary refuge is an emerging norm. 184 Commentators dis-
agree, however, about whether state practice is sufficiently uniform to 
establish principles of nonrefoulement and temporary refuge applicable 
to all persons in refugee-type situations, including those "who seek 
shelter from conditions of general armed violence or natural disaster," 
but who fail to meet the Refugee Convention's individualized persecu-
tion definition. 185 The two customary law norms are considered below. 
1. Nonrefoulement under Customary Law 
According to the High Commissioner for Refugees, "[t]he most 
fundamental of protection principles and the first of refugee rights is 
182 See Paust, supra note 170, at 72-77; PROTECTIONS AFFORDED REFUGEES, supra note 101, 
at 18-20. 
183 A "peremptory" norm is a norm that is "absolute; conclusive; positive; not admitting of 
question, delay, or reconsideration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (4th ed. 1968); see Note on 
International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's Programme, 36th Sess., paras. 17, 24, U.N. Doc. AI AC.96/660 (1985) [herein-
after 1985 Note on International Protection] ("The fundamental principle of non-refoulement . .. 
is an overriding legal principle having a normative character independent of international 
instruments .... Apart from being embodied in a large number of international treaties and 
declarations, the principle is today considered as part of general international law."); GUY S. 
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 73, 97 (1983) ("State practice in cases of 
mass influx ... offers some support for the idea that non-refoulement applies ... to the frequently 
large groups of persons who do not in fact enjoy the protection of the government of their 
country of origin .... The evidence relating to the meaning and scope of non-refoulement ... 
amply supports the conclusion that today the principle forms part of general international law. "); 
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE PROTECTION ON THE 
FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE CONVENTION 24 n.34 (1991) 
[hereinafter UNCERTAIN HAVEN] ("The principle of non-refoulement is now considered a norm 
of customary international law binding even on those states which are not parties to the interna-
tional conventions."). 
184 See Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 
26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 558 (1986) ("Countries generally provide safe refuge and protection to 
fleeing civilian victims of internal armed conflict on at least a temporary basis either until the 
states determine the civilians to be refugees in the strict sense, or until some other permanent 
means of assuring their security is arranged."); Hartman, supra note 115, at 87-94 ("the norm 
of temporary refuge ... has become a binding rule of international law"). 
185 Hailbronner, supra note 111, at 123, 124, 128-29 ("A universal norm of nonrefoulement is 
unlikely to crystallize in the near future because states fear losing control of their borders. The 
reality of state interests militates against complete coverage for humanitarian refugees."). But see 
Hartman, supra note 115, at 87--88 (discussing temporary refuge in relation to the formally 
codified norm of nonrefoulement); Parker, supra note 138, at 37-39 (arguing that refugees are 
entitled to full respect of the principle of nonrefoulement even though they may not be entitled 
to political asylum). 
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that of non-refoulement .... [T] his principle is today considered as part 
of general international law."186 The right of nonrefoulement, derived 
from conventional and customary internationallaw,187 provides protec-
tion for those whose lives or freedom would be threatened if they 
returned to their homeland.188 State practice since the inception of 
formal refugee protections in 1951, embodied in the Refugee Conven-
tion, provides "persuasive evidence of the concretization of [this] cus-
tomary rule."189 Moreover, the practice of bodies such as the U.N. 
General Assembly and the UNHCR-organizations that regularly en-
dorse nonrefoulement as a customary norm-has "tended to be adopted 
by consensus" in the international community.190 
Expansion of the rule beyond Article 33 of the Refugee Conven-
tion embraces a larger class of "humanitarian" refugees: persons not 
receiving protection from the government of their own nation who 
have sought temporary asylum in a third country.191 Certain conditions 
trigger this broader principle of nonrefoulement and the protection it 
entails. Thus, a state may not return foreigners to a country known 
to produce refugees or possess a record of persistent human rights 
abuses, nor to a country engaged in civil war or internal disruption, 
unless such forcible return can be justified by conditions in the return-
ees' home country.192 The existence of a plan for involuntary repatria-
tion therefore places on the returning state the burden of dispelling 
concerns that the refugees will suffer abuse or persecution upon their 
return.193 
186 Repart of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 40th Sess., para. 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/43/12 (1985). 
187 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is the primary conventional source of nonrefaule-
ment. See supra notes 103-32 and accompanying text. 
188 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 114, at 105. 
189GoODwIN-GILL, supra note 183, at 98. 
190Id. In a 1985 report, the UNHCR indicated that despite some "worrisome and noteworthy" 
exceptions, "most States continued to adhere to the principle of nowrefoulement." 1985 Note on 
International Protection, supra note 183, para. 25. 
191 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 114, at 105; see also Hartman, supra note 115, at 87-88. Hartman 
contends that the modern principle of nonrefaulement is not so much an expansion of codified 
refugee law (such as, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention) as it is "a norm of customary 
humanitarian law." Hartman, supra note 115, at 87. But see Hailbronner, supra note Ill, at 
123-24. Hailbronner argues that an examination of state practice refutes the idea that nonrefaule-
ment has developed into a norm of customary international law protecting all temporary asylum 
seekers. Rather, Hailbronner claims, nonrefaulement in actual practice "protects [only] a limited 
number of humanitarian refugees." Id. at 124. 
192Goodwin-Gill, supra note 114, at 105. In general, refugees should "be allowed to remain 
[in a third country] while the conditions producing their flight persist." Id. at 109. 
193Id. Obligations drawn from conventional and customary international law "enjoin any 
action on the part of a state which returns or has the effect of returning refugees to territories 
where their lives or freedom may be threatened." Id. at 106. 
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Additionally, there exists under human rights law the freedom not 
to be returned to a nation with a record of widespread or egregious 
human rights abuse.194 This right of nonrefoulement differs from the 
norm derived from refugee law, however, as it is based on protection 
from torture rather than on freedom from persecution due to race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.195 ''When torture is alleged under human rights law, the 
right of non-refoulement arises when the country of origin tortures or is 
a gross violator of human rights. "196 Because Burma under the SLORC 
fits this definition,197 international human rights principles protect the 
Rohingyas against forced expulsion from Bangladesh. 
2. Temporary Refuge Under Customary Law 
Closely related to the principle of nonrefoulement is the right of 
temporary refuge, an important concept for the majority of present-
day refugees who, although they seek protection from internal strife 
until conditions improve at home, do not intend to remain perma-
nently in a third country.19B Like nonrefoulernent, temporary refuge 
entails a ban on forced repatriation. 199 Although the two concepts are 
often equated,200 temporary refuge is properly characterized not as an 
expansion of modern refugee doctrine, but as a norm derived from 
customary humanitarian law.201 As such, the right of temporary refuge 
applies to persons suffering as a consequence of ongoing armed con-
flict in their country of origin. Persons seeking temporary refuge 
generally are not themselves the targets of persecution or the victims 
of an intentional failure to provide protection; rather, they are inno-
cents who in fact cannot rely on the government for their safety.202 
194 See Parker, supra note 138, at 35. 
195Id. at 35. 
196 Id. 
197 See generally RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3. 
198 Perluss & Hartman, supra note 184, at 554. 
199 "The customary norm of temporary refuge prohibits a state from forcibly repatriating 
foreign nationals who [have] fled generalized violence and other threats to their lives and security 
caused by internal armed conflict within their own state." Id. 
200The UNHCR, for example, has "recently begun to speak of temporary refuge as a 
component included within the customary principle of nonrefoulement .... " Hartman, supra note 
115, at 88. 
201Id. at 87. Temporary refuge is "premised on a basic notion of humanitarian law: civilians 
are entitled to an international standard of protection because their state, distracted by its 
conflict, is unable to provide them with de facto protection." Id. at 88. 
202 See id. at 87-88. 
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Under the customary norm of temporary refuge, unlike the tra-
ditional concept of permanent asylum, the international community 
does not require those fleeing conflict to prove persecution or inten-
tional neglect by their government to receive protection.203 A grant of 
temporary asylum merely acknowledges a state's inability to safeguard 
its inhabitants, without assigning blame to the government of the 
refugees' country of origin.204 The ban on forced repatriation contin-
ues until the armed conflict at home ends and the country of origin 
can guarantee the security of its nationals.205 In practice, the UNHCR 
routinely merges this evolving norm of temporary asylum with the 
ingrained concept of nonrefoulement, and treats persons who seek pro-
tection under conditions relevant to either principle as "refugees. "206 
The level of treatment prescribed in United Nations policy state-
ments is not so clearly generous. Although repeatedly emphasizing the 
"absolute nature of [a] prohibition on forced repatriation of civilian 
war victims,"207 the UNHCR has also indicated that seekers of tempo-
rary refuge do not necessarily enjoy the full range of protections 
provided under the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol.2°8 For 
example, whereas the UNHCR maintains that "detention [of refugees] 
should normally be avoided," the agency does not regard freedom of 
movement to be an inviolable guarantee.209 Particularly in "situations 
of large-scale influx," the government of the country to which asylum 
seekers have fled may detain them on a variety of grounds.210 Nonethe-
less, the conditions of detention must meet certain internationally 
203 See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 184, at 599. 
204Id. at 597-98. 
205Id. at 554. 
206 See Hartman, supra note 115, at 88. 
207Id. at 89. A recent UNHCR report even refers to the prohibition as a peremptory norm, 
a rule of jus cogens. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 40th Sess., para. 
22, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985). 
208 See Report of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 36th Sess., para. 
6, U.N. Doc. AjAC.96/660 (1985). 
209Refugee Convention, supra note lO5, art. 26. 
210 Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 12A, U.N. 
Doc. A/41/12/ Add. 1 (1986). The UNHCR has determined that valid grounds for detaining 
refugees include: 
Id. 
to verity identity; to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status 
or asylum was based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers had 
destroyed their travel and/or identification documents or had used fraudulent 
documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intended 
to claim asylum; or to protect national security or public order .... 
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recognized minimum standards.211 According to one commentator, the 
practice of states indicates that seekers of temporary refuge are, at a 
minimum, entitled to physical space in which to live, an opportunity 
to receive assistance from humanitarian relief groups or the interna-
tional community, and, most importantly, protection from forcible 
repatriation.212 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Burma and Bangladesh are engaged in a political struggle, in 
which they have subordinated their obligations under international law 
to concerns of sovereignty, economic stability, domestic security, and-
in the case of the SLORC-a brazen desire for power and material 
gain.213 The Rohingyas, meanwhile, are victims, of both their own 
nation's dictators and the military and police officials in their host 
country. The government of Bangladesh is unlikely to comply volun-
tarily with the full range of its obligations under international law,214 
and Burma's military junta has demonstrated little willingness to act 
in accordance with even the most basic international standards of 
conduct.215 The United Nations and the international community must 
therefore devise means of bringing the force of law to bear in order 
to prevent a disastrous outcome of the current Rohingya refugee crisis. 
Since forcibly seizing power in September 1988, the SLORC has 
repeatedly shown its disregard for the demands of internationallaw,216 
211 The UNHCR has reported with concern "that many refugees and asylum·seekers had to 
spend considerable periods in detention, sometimes exceeding one year, with no possibility of 
judicial or administrative review of the detention measure .... " 1985 Note on International 
Protection, supra note IS3, para. 2S. 
212 Hartman, supra note US, at 91-92, lOS-09. 
213 See, e.g., BURMA TODAY, supra note IS, at 4,6 (estimating that Burma devotes at least 50% 
of its gross national product to military spending). 
[Thel SLORC has used the money raised through foreign investment and the drug 
trade solely for its own survival. Improving the living standards of the Burmese 
people and rebuilding the country's moribund economy have been largely ignored 
by the ruling clique, and they have used the money instead for personal enrichment 
and a large build-up of personnel and weapons in the military. 
Id. at 27. 
214 See ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 6-7 (reporting denial of Bangladeshi 
authorities that Rohingyas in the camps had been systematically abused and tortured by security 
forces, and their insistence that conditions in Arakan were sufficiently improved such that "any 
continuing refugee concerns about returning were not legitimate."); see also Memorandum of 
Understanding, supra note 9S, at 412-15. 
215 See supra notes 14S--64 and accompanying text. 
216 Senior General Saw Maung, former SLORC Chairman, has articulated the junta's ap-
proach to human rights: "[Ilf anyone wants to enjoy the human rights they have in the U.S., 
England, or India, provided that country accepts, I will permit them to leave. But in Burma, I 
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acting only in the narrow financial and political interests of its elite 
military leaders. The U.S. Department of State has characterized 
Burma's human rights record under SLORC rule as "among the 
world's worst," and its government as "among the most repressive."217 
Moreover, official government statements indicate that the junta is 
growing increasingly obstinate in its resistance to pressure from the 
world community.218 
Although they cannot justly be compared to the military dictators 
in Rangoon, Bangladeshi officials have acted out of self-interest as well, 
endeavoring primarily to rid themselves of the problems created by the 
SLORC's repressive activities in Burma. Bangladesh has agreed to 
repatriate only those refugees who volunteer to return to Burma,219 and 
can only grant human rights suitable for the Burmese people." PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE 
INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 4. U Kyaw Min, Burma's permanent representative to the United 
Nations, characterized a 1992 Commission for Human Rights resolution that contained allega· 
tions of SLORC responsibility for torture, extrajudicial executions, and other flagrant human 
rights abuses as "totally one-sided and unjust, highly intrusive, and interventionist .... In a word 
it is irrelevant ... the government of Myanmar [Burma] disassociates itself from the Commis-
sion's decision." Id. at 19. 
217BuRMA TODAY, supra note 18, at 32 (quoting statement issued by U.S. Department of 
State) . 
21R See Asia Watch Press Release, supra note 86, at 1. General Saw Maung, articulating the 
junta's position on the release of political detainees and the transfer of power to elected repre-
sentatives, has declared, "I am not a person who can accept proposals such as resolving issues 
through political means." BURMA TODAY, supra note 18, at 49. In a statement issued by the 
Burmese Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, the SLORC responded to reports concerning extensive 
abuse of the Rohingyas' human rights and the ensuing flight of refugees from Arakan: 
Recently foreign broadcasting stations ... have carried exaggerated and fabricated 
reports that a large number of Myanmar Muslims have fled to Bangladesh due to 
the repression by Myanmar authorities of Muslims in the Rakhine [Arakan] State 
.... Moreover, attempts are being made to discredit the Myanmar Naing-Ngan 
using the so-called "Rohingya" problems .... [The SLORC] has strictly adhered 
to norms and principles of international practice. The Tatrnadaw [Burmese Army], 
with its noble tradition, does not torture or commit brutal acts against the people 
and has always scrupulously avoided sets [sic] of religious oppression. 
Press Statement, Ministry of Foreign Mfuirs of the Union of Myanmar, Freedom of Worship 
Flourishes in Myanmar Naing-Ngan, Attempts to Sow Discord Between Myanmar Naing-Ngan and 
Bangladesh Will Fail (Feb. 21, 1992), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 
302-03. 
219 A Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Bangladeshi government and the 
UNHCR provides that: 
[Bangladesh and the UNHCR] shall cooperate with each other to ensure safe and 
voluntary repatriation of Myanmar refugees who opt to return under existing 
conditions ... on the basis of their (refugees) own judgement of the situation in 
their country .... The two sides shall cooperate with each other to prevent any 
attempt by any side to interfere with the exercise of freedom of option by the 
refugees. 
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 98, at 413. 
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has earned credibility by actively pursuing United Nations involvement 
in the proceedings.22o Since 1992, however, Bangladesh has forced 
thousands of refugees back across the border to Arakan,221 and govern-
ment authorities have repeatedly insisted on the rapid repatriation of 
all Rohingyas within the nation's territory.222 Denying allegations made 
by the UNHCR and human rights groups that authorities have re-
turned refugees against their will, Bangladeshi officials have claimed 
that the Rohingyas "have nothing to fear because conditions in Burma 
[have] improved."223 Nevertheless, truly "safe and voluntary" repatria-
tion cannot occur until the United Nations establishes international 
monitors inside Burma to ensure that the rights of returnees are not 
violated. 224 
The obligations imposed by international law are simply not ade-
quate to protect the Rohingyas from abuse at the hands of Bangladeshi 
police in the refugee camps; from forcible repatriation to Arakan; and 
from continued rape, murder, religious persecution, and generalized 
violation of their human rights after they return to Burma. This Part 
recommends various measures that could be taken to persuade the 
Burmese and Bangladeshi governments to provide the refugees with the 
protection and assistance required under international law. Although 
their legal responsibilities are clear and unavoidable, "international 
law does not amount to much without some procedure to enforce it."225 
Devising an enforcement strategy necessitates moving outside the 
realm oflaw to a consideration of solutions attainable via humanitarian 
assistance and diplomatic intervention. 
The international community, through the leadership of the 
UNHCR and other multilateral organizations, should pursue three 
goals with respect to Burmese refugees in Bangladesh. First, Ban-
gladeshi officials must guarantee the Rohingyas' safety in the camps, 
and must utilize available humanitarian assistance to provide the refu-
gees with adequate basic services: food, shelter, sanitation, and medical 
care.226 United Nations monitors should ensure that Bangladeshi au-
220 See DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
221 See Bangladesh Urged, supra note 90 (reporting the involuntary repatriation of more than 
4000 Burmese refugees); see also U.S. Department of State Press Release, supra note 81 ("The 
U.S. government deplores the use of coercion by the government of Bangladesh ... [and] calls 
upon the government of Bangladesh to refrain from coerced repatriation .... "). 
22'2 Asia Watch Press Release, supra note 86, at 1. 
223Id. at 1-2. 
224 See HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 12. 
225 Mark W. Janis, Book Review, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 767, 768 (1989) (reviewing CHRISTINE 
D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1987». 
226 According to the UNHCR, scabies afflict 75% of refugees in the camps because of the 
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thorities stop the beatings, rapes, and extortion of Rohingyas that local 
police have perpetrated.227 In addition, UNHCR personnel should keep 
track of humanitarian aid shipments that arrive in Bangladesh, and 
confirm that the supplies actually reach the Rohingyas in the camps. 
Second, UNHCR personnel should monitor the actual repatriation 
process to ensure that refugees who have expressed the desire to 
remain in Bangladesh are not returned against their will.22s The 
UNHCR should resume confidential screening of individual refugees, 
and compile lists of all persons seeking to leave the camps and resettle 
in Burma. For all who do wish to return home, Bangladesh should 
provide safe repatriation to Arakan.229 
Third, the UNHCR and other international organizations should 
assist in the resettlement of returnees inside Arakan, including deliv-
ering basic services and monitoring the activities of Burmese military 
forces in the region.230 In order to achieve these three goals, the United 
Nations and involved members of the international community must 
simultaneously pursue two distinct courses of action--one humanitar-
ian, and the other diplomatic. 
A. Humanitarian Assistance 
On the humanitarian side, the UNHCR is the organization best 
suited to monitor the activities of Burmese and Bangladeshi officials, 
to ensure that repatriation of the Rohingyas is truly "safe and volun-
tary," and to negotiate a lasting scheme for the refugees' resettlement 
in Arakan or permanent asylum in a third country. UNHCR officials 
have been on-site in Bangladesh since March 1992, assisting in the 
construction and administration of camps, distributing donations from 
relief organizations, and conducting informal interviews with the refu-
gees.231 The UNHCR should continue these efforts, including formal 
screening of refugees in the camps. 
poor quality of rice available and the lack of dairy products and leafy vegetables in their diets; 
more than 22,000 refugees have inadequate shelter; heavy rains during the monsoon season 
damage many sanitary facilities (although the ratio of latrines has increased to one for every 20 
persons); and the health situation is not expected to change. U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Information Sheet on Myanmar/Bangladesh Refugee Situation (June 3, 1993) [hereinafter 
UNHCR Information Sheet], in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 418. 
227 See ABUSE OF BURMESE REFUGEES, supra note 3, at 7-15. 
228Id. at 413-14. 
229 See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 98, at 412-15. 
230Id. at 414. The UNHCR plans to begin operations in Arakan to provide assistance to 
returnees in early 1994. HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 12. 
231 PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 13. In response to the 
Bangladeshi government's request for help, the UNHCR introduced a $27.3 million program of 
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In order to improve the screening process, the UNHCR should 
train personnel conducting refugee interviews to identify those indi-
viduals who meet the requirements for permanent asylum in third 
countries,232 should provide counseling for seekers of asylum, and 
should provide legal assistance to asylum seekers who wish to appeal 
repatriation decisions made by Bangladeshi officials.233 Recognizing 
that "a fair status determination process is the key to the legitimacy" 
of any scheme involving refugee screening, provision of asylum, or 
repatriation, the UNHCR should formulate a plan of action for the 
Rohingyas that "sets forth the elements of refugee status determination 
as well as the requirements for implementation which are to ensure 
fair screening. "234 
The UNHCR should also diligently monitor the Rohingyas' return 
and resettlement in Arakan,235 and international relief agencies should 
establish programs to help refugees rebuild their lives in Burma.236 In 
addition to UNHCR presence in the area, the United Nations should 
pressure the SLORC to provide access to returnees inside Burma to 
an international human rights monitoring team formed under the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Hu-
man Rights.237 Unless such steps can be implemented, "those Burmese 
Muslims returning from Bangladesh, thousands of whom had been 
refugee assistance. Id. The UNHCR's proposed budget for 1993 included approximately $19.6 
million for its operations in Bangladesh, and an additional $15 million for assistance of Burmese 
refugees. UNHCR Information Sheet, supra note 226, at 418. 
232 Evidence of individual persecution, gained from refugee interviews, would entitle those 
Rohingyas who satisfy the formal "refugee" definition to the full range of protections available 
under the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol. See supra notes 103-32 and accompanying 
text. As human rights lawyers have recognized, "[a] screening procedure that does not accurately 
determine refugee status runs a risk of returning refugees who fear persecution in violation of 
the principle ofnon-refoulement" UNCERTAIN HAVEN, supra note 183, at 24. 
233 Id. at 20-21. 
234 Id. at 19. 
235 The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the SLORC and the UNHCR on Novem-
ber 5, 1993 provides that the "UNHCR will be given access to all returnees; that the returnees 
will be issued with the appropriate identification papers and that the returnees will enjoy the 
same freedom of movement as all other nationals." HUMAN RiGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 
I, at 12. 
236 Along with the UNHCR, the U.N. Food Programme plans to provide assistance in Arakan 
beginning in early 1994. Id. Oxfam and other nongovernmental organizations are currently 
aiding the Bangladeshi government's efforts in the camps. UNHCR Information Sheet, supra note 
226, at 418. 
237 See Yokota, supra note 15, at 402-03. According to the Special Rapporteur, such a team 
would "operate with an integrated human rights/humanitarian approach with consideration for 
the refugee and repatriation issues ... [and] be composed of independent experts and selected 
representatives of the specialized agencies with expertise in the relevant areas." Id. at 403. 
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detained by the tatmadaw before fleeing the country, would be particu-
larly at risk of a reoccurrence of human rights violations.. "238 
B. Diplomatic Intervention 
On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, U.N. Under 
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Mfairs, is well situated to arrange 
and facilitate talks between the governments of Burma and Bangla-
desh. The repatriation agreement signed on April 28, 1992 by Ban-
gladeshi officials and SLORC leaders239 resulted largely from Eliasson's 
efforts.24o The SLORC's recent decision to grant the UNHCR access to 
returnees inside Burma241 offers some hope that the junta will respond 
to continuing pressure from the world community.242 In addition to 
continuing diplomatic negotiations with the governments of both 
countries, Eliasson should convince the General Assembly to extend 
his mandate243 to include supervision of emergency relief efforts across 
the border to persons inside Burma.244 Such an expanded role would 
likely receive support not only from Western nations, but also from 
nations in the region245 that have protested the SLORC's persecution 
of the Rohingyas in the past.246 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is important to recognize that international legal principles such 
as nonrejoulement and temporary refuge provide nothing more than 
interim solutions to a much larger and more difficult set of problems. 
The United Nations, the international community, and international 
238 HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 12. 
239 Joint Statements, supra note 8, at 309-15. 
24oTelephone Interview with Linda Hazou, Office of the U.N. Under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Mfairs (Mar. 4, 1993). Ms. Hazou indicated that, although repatriations have 
continued despite the lack of formal involvement of either the UNHCR or Ambassador Eliasson, 
informal discussions are ongoing between the two United Nations bodies and the governments 
of both Bangladesh and Burma. 
241 HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 12. 
242The SLORC shows little willingness, however, to ease its grip on power or to improve the 
overall human rights climate in the country. Interview with U Bo Hla Tint, Minister for Foreign 
Mfuirs, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24, 
1994); see Yokota, supra note 15, at 365-403. 
243 At present, Ambassador Eliasson's mandate is primarily to coordinate aid. PROPOSAL FOR 
CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 7, at 15. 
244 See id. at 18. 
245 Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Pakistan have all expressed 
concern about the plight of the Rohingyas, and have urged the SLORC to agree on a peaceful 
solution to the crisis. RAPE, FORCED LABOR AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 3, at 23. 
246Id. at 16. 
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law obligates all affected states to work toward alleviating the causes of 
mass refugee migrations, be they overt human rights abuses or merely 
intolerably dangerous living conditions.247 Beyond working to compel 
the SLORC to discontinue its gross and persistent violation of the 
Burmese people's human rights, the United Nations and the interna-
tional community should work to remove the military regime from 
power and to replace it with a democratically elected government.248 
Solving the underlying animosities and conflicts that produce mass 
refugee populations would eliminate the need for permanent or tem-
porary third country asylum altogether. 
The world's refugee situation is not hopeful, with more than 
sixteen million persons currently displaced from their countries of 
origin-unable, or simply too afraid, to return home. 249 Nevertheless, 
by pursuing all available means to secure international protection, 
humanitarian assistance, and voluntary return or resettlement, today's 
refugees-including the Rohingyas of Arakan-may become tomor-
row's recognized and respected national citizens. 
247 See supra notes 165-81 and accompanying text. 
248 The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma recommends that concerned 
nations take the following actions: 
Champion Burmese democracy at the UN by moving the issue from the humani-
tarian and human rights level to the political level. Push for Security Council 
sanctions and action, including unseating the SLORC at the UN, the removal of 
LDC [less developed country] status, and the suspension of UNDP and UNDCP 
programmes in Burma until political prisoners are released and political power is 
transferred. A UN sponsored nation-wide ceasefire, peace talks, and a transition to 
multi-party democracy would be ideal. 
U Sein Win, Prime Minister, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, Statement 
on Humanitarian and Political Action Concerning Burma (undated), in DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS 
IN BURMA, supra note 3, at 279. 
249WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 19, at 32-33. 
